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The Internet of Things (“IoT”) is here, and we seem to be going
all in. We are trying to put a microchip in nearly every object that is
not nailed down and even a few that are. Soon, your cars, toasters,
toys, and even your underwear will be wired up to make your lives
better. The general thought seems to be that “Internet connectivity
makes good objects great.” While the IoT might be incredibly useful,
we should proceed carefully. Objects are not necessarily better
simply because they are connected to the Internet. Often, the Internet
can make objects worse and users worse-off. Digital technologies
can be hacked. Each new camera, microphone, and sensor adds
another vector for attack and another point of surveillance in our
everyday lives. The problem is that privacy and data security law
have failed to recognize some “things” are more dangerous than
others as part of the IoT. Some objects, like coffee pots and dolls, can
last long after the standard life-cycle of software. Meanwhile cheap,
disposable objects, like baby wipes, might not be worth outfitting
with the most secure hardware and software. Yet they all are part of
the network. This essay argues that the nature of the “thing” in the
IoT should play a more prominent role in privacy and data security
law. The decision to wire up an object should be coupled with
responsibilities to make sure its users are protected. Only then, can
we trust the Internet of Heirlooms and Disposable Things.
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I. INTRODUCTION
We have become drunk on our ability to connect anything to
the Internet. Barbie dolls, baby monitors, coffee pots, refrigerators,
clothes, watches, and cars—we have connected it all. It seems
there is nothing we cannot improve by sticking a chip in it.
If you want a sense of just how mad we’ve become, look at the
Twitter account “Internet of Shit” (@internetofshit), which
satirizes what has come to be known as the “Internet of Things”
(“IoT”).1 This account is a parade of dubious decisions to take an
object, any object, and put a chip in it. Light switches, cooking
pans, stuffed animals, basketballs, headbands, water bottles, rectal
thermometers, and more are now all connected to the Internet and
our mobile devices.2 Japanese security researchers have already

1

Internet of Shit, TWITTER, https://mobile.twitter.com/internetofshit (last
visited April 17, 2016).
2
See, e.g., Internet of Shit, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/internetofshit/
status/694526620795867136 (last visited Apr. 17, 2016); Seed- The Smart Bottle
That Never Forgets About You, INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/
projects/seed-the-smart-bottle-that-never-forgets-about-you#/; Cory Doctorow,
The Internet of Things In your Butt: Smart Rectal Thermometer, BOINGBOING
(Jan. 14, 2016), http://boingboing.net/2016/01/14/the-internet-of-things-inyour.html; Arielle Duhaime-Ross, This Headband Analyzes Your Sweat to
Improve Your Workout, THE VERGE (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.theverge.com/
2016/1/27/10840680/sweat-wearable-analysis-real-time-berkeley.

MAY 2016]The Internet of Heirlooms and Disposable Things

583

hacked an IoToilet, giving them the ability to flush and squirt
water at people. A literal “Internet of Shit.”3
Of course, the IoT can be quite useful. Many devices are
improved upon when they are connected. Automated cars could
save millions of lives. Wearable technologies could detect health
problems long before symptoms manifest. Toys connected to the
Internet can be educational and therapeutic. Everyday technologies
like TVs and books that are connected to the Internet can be
configured to aid those living with disabilities. The IoT can make
all of our lives easier and more pleasant. Of course, schlocky
products might seem ridiculous. But consumer preferences vary
and markets accommodate all kinds of tastes. They are not
restricted to offering necessary items and well-made goods.
The problem is that we are not taking the decision to wire up
an artifact to the Internet seriously enough. A chip-centric
mentality has taken over—one that is guided by an overly
simplistic principle: “Internet connectivity makes good objects
great.” Guided by this upgrade mentality, we seem to be in a rush
to connect everything. Meanwhile seemingly none of us, including
policy makers and regulators, have fully appreciated the
significance of companies transforming from artifact and device
“makers” to “service providers.”
The digital transition should give us deep pause for thought.
Objects are not necessarily better simply because they are
connected to the Internet. Often, the Internet can make objects
worse and users worse off. IoT objects only fulfill their designed
purposes when their software works. But software that works today
can crash tomorrow. Software needs upgrades to fix problems.
Connectivity allows for regular updates. But it also provides an
3

See, e.g., Jasper Hamill, Hackers take control of a Toilet using bog-standard
computer skills, MIRROR (Feb. 10, 2016) http://www.mirror.co.uk/tech/hackerstake-control-toilet-using-7342662. Wired magazine hosted sponsored content
titled The Toilet and Its Role in the Internet of Things. Giles Crouch, The Toilet
and Its Role in the Internet of Things, WIRED (Apr. 2014),
http://www.wired.com/insights/2014/04/toilet-role-internet-things/.
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attack vector for hackers and allows companies to render your IoT
object inoperable whenever it likes. Consider how Google plans to
shut down its Revolv hub designed to control lights, alarms, and
doors.4
More fundamentally, the IoT requires adaptive design that
thoughtfully attends to key features, including user functionality,
security, and privacy. While the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) requires reasonable data security from those collecting
personal information, it has yet to grapple with all of these nuances
and the systemic reasons why the IoT adds a host of vulnerabilities
to our lives.5
Some IoT companies like VTech are washing their hands of
responsibility. The company’s IoT kids toys were hacked, leading
to a massive data spill on Shodan (the search engine for the
Internet of Things).6 VTech’s embarrassing data breach exposed
personal data on 6 million children.7
4

Revolv Devices Bricked as Google's Nest Shuts Down Smart Home Company,
THE GUARDIAN, (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/
apr/05/revolv-devices-bricked-google-nest-smart-home (“Against that background,
losing customer trust could be a damaging move,” Gilbert said. “I’m genuinely
worried though. This move by Google opens up an entire host of concerns about
other Google hardware. Which hardware will Google choose to intentionally
brick next? . . . Is your Nexus device safe? What about your Nest fire/smoke
alarm? What about your Dropcam? What about your Chromecast device? Will
Google/Nest endanger your family at some point?”).
5
See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New
Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014); Brian Krebs, IoT
Reality: Smart Devices, Dumb Defaults, KREBS ON SECURITY (Feb. 18, 2016),
http://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/02/iot-reality-smart-devices-dumb-defaults/
[hereinafter Krebs, Smart Devices, Dumb Defaults].
6
See, e.g., Lack of Database and Password Security Leaves Millions of Users
Exposed, DUO (Dec. 15, 2015), https://duo.com/blog/lack-of-database-andpassword-security-leaves-millions-of-users-exposed; J.M. Porup, ‘Internet of
Things’ Security is Hilariously Broken and Getting Worse, ARS TECHNICA (Jan.
23, 2016), http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/01/how-to-search-the-internetof-things-for-photos-of-sleeping-babies/.
7
Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Hacked Toy Company Vtech’s TOS Now Says
It’s Not Liable for Hacks, VICE (Feb. 9, 2016), http://motherboard.vice.com/
read/hacked-toy-company-vtech-tos-now-says-its-not-liable-for-hacks.
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In its Terms and Conditions for its software, VTech now
includes the following ominous language in all-caps: “YOU
ACKNOWLEDGE AND AGREE THAT ANY INFORMATION
YOU SEND OR RECEIVE DURING YOUR USE OF THE SITE
MAY NOT BE SECURE AND MAY BE INTERCEPTED OR
LATER ACQUIRED BY UNAUTHORIZED PARTIES.”8 This
reads more like fodder for a Saturday Night Live sketch than what
we would expect out of a reasonable Terms of Use agreement.
Even when companies intend to keep their products safe and
secure over the course of their use, the fact remains that they might
not be around to see their commitment through.9 “Here today, gone
tomorrow” might as well be the epigram of Silicon Valley where
the spirit of disruption drives innovation more than the ethos of
sustainability.
Simply put, what’s to stop a whole bunch of well-intentioned
companies from producing IoT products that sell moderately or
even poorly, but fail to be sufficiently profitable to prevent them
from going out of business shortly after their goods hit the shelves?
If that happens, they likely will not have the resources to provide
further security work. And yet, if the products remain functional
past the point of being serviced, consumers either must stop using
them or take personal responsibility for security breaches via the
“buyer beware” mentality. This makes many IoT objects more
costly and risky than their “dumb” counterparts.

8

Id.
See, e.g., Yash Kotak, 5 Reasons Why My IoT Startup Failed, VENTUREBEAT
(June 16, 2015), http://venturebeat.com/2015/06/16/5-reasons-why-my-iotstartup-failed/; Nat Garlin, Quirky Files for Bankruptcy, Will Likely Sell its IoT
Company Wink in the Next 60 Days, THE NEXT WEB (Sept. 22, 2015),
http://thenextweb.com/insider/2015/09/22/quirky-bankruptcy/.
9
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II. “THINGS” ARE DIFFERENT AND MORE DANGEROUS THAN
COMPUTERS
The IoT is rife with privacy and security problems.10 But our
debate has, up to this point, been focused more on the “Internet”
part of the IoT rather than the “Things” that are connected. Our
laws and rhetoric have failed to scrutinize the differing nature of
“things,” as if they all pose the same risks as computers and
standard information technologies. But this is simply not true.
Artifacts differ from computers and each other. The nature of an
artifact and its design will influence a range of outcomes, including
how we use it, where we put it, how much attention we pay to it,
and how long we will keep it. In turn, these variables impact the
extent to which vulnerabilities are created and persist.
Wiring a computer up to the Internet is not the same thing as
wiring up an object that has non-processing uses like a doll or
refrigerator. Computers that cannot connect to the Internet are of
limited value in the age of cloud computing. The same cannot be
said for the IoT, where Internet connectivity is often not essential
to an object’s core function. Dolls can be played with, clothes and
diapers can be worn, coffee pots can still heat, and refrigerators
can cool all without WiFi.
Some of these objects are likely to be used long after the
vendor stops servicing them with critical security updates, known
as “patches.”11 By contrast, objects like IoT diapers and shampoo
bottles are meant to be quickly used and disposed of. These small,
disposable objects are hard to service because of their limited
bandwidth and storage capacities.12 It is often too costly to invest in
security for these disposable objects. Yet they remain persistent
10

See, e.g., Scott Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps
Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L.
REV. 85 (2014).
11
Institution Systems & Tech., Why Patch? MASS. INST. OF TECH.,
https://ist.mit.edu/security/patches (last visited Apr. 13, 2016).
12
Parc Lawrence Lee, How the ‘Internet of Everyday Things’ Could Turn Any
Product into a Service, VENTURE BEAT (Feb. 7, 2015), http://venturebeat.com/2015/
02/07/how-the-internet-of-everyday-things-could-turn-any-product-into-a-service/.
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risks in our home networks.13 Security researcher Brian Krebs
notes that poorly configured default settings for IoT devices are a
security nightmare.14 This is particularly true for devices that are
costly to change, like many disposable and cheap IoT devices.
Some companies are even developing products like thin,
adhesive films that will turn any object into an IoT artifact.15 This
13

See, e.g., Krebs, Smart Devices, Dumb Defaults, supra note 5; Brian Krebs,
This is Why People Fear the ‘Internet of Things,’ KREBS ON SECURITY (Feb. 18,
2016), https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/02/this-is-why-people-fear-the-internet-ofthings/; Kashmir Hill, Article May Scare You Away from Internet of Things,
FORBES (May 27, 2016) [hereinafter Krebs, This is Why People Fear the
‘Internet of Things’] http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/05/27/
article-may-scare-you-away-from-internet-of-things/#3e6ec4ab23dd
(“The
reason why [Internet of Things] vendors are not doing security better is that it’s
cheaper not to do it. It’s expensive to build security in. The shopper in Best Buy
will buy the camera for $40 not the one that’s $100. She doesn’t know or care
about the security. There will be more and more hacks, not just of cameras but
of lots of things. Eventually it will make people care, and it will be more
expensive to be insecure than secure.”).
14
See, e.g., Brian Krebs, The Lingering Mess from Default Insecurity, KREBS
ON SECURITY (Nov. 12, 2015), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/11/thelingering-mess-from-default-insecurity/ (“As the Internet of Things grows, we
can scarcely afford a massive glut of things that are insecure-by-design. One
reason is that this stuff has far too long a half-life, and it will remain in our
Internet’s land and streams for many years to come . . . . Mass-deployed,
insecure-by-default devices are difficult and expensive to clean up and/or harden
for security, and the costs of that vulnerability are felt across the Internet and
around the globe.”); Krebs, This is Why People Fear the ‘Internet of Things’,
supra note 13.
15
Rakesh Sharma, A New Perspective On The Internet Of Things, FORBES
(Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/rakeshsharma/2014/02/18/a-newperspective-on-the-internet-of-things/#53652d3d267c (“As an example, Sutija
points to Blue Tooth, which has low power requirements and transmits
information over short distances. ‘(Using this approach) you can distribute
intelligence broadly over a large number of simple devices (or, devices that are
not IoT ready)’ he says. Instead of big data, which relies on constant monitoring,
such devices use small data or snippets of information at specific periods of
time. For example, consumers can measure their vitals through temporary
monitoring tests that use disposable electronics instead of conventional
electronics. ‘We want to add intelligence to ordinary objects that are also
disposable,’ says Sutija.”).
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might be the quickest way to scale the IoT in our homes. But every
new IoT connection brings new risks. For example, it might take
people a while to treat everyday objects with the same care they
give to their computers. Until we change our mindsets, our daily
routines will not include updating our coffee maker’s operating
system.
Krebs asserts that “[b]efore purchasing an ‘Internet of things’
(IoT) device . . . consider whether you can realistically care for and
feed the security needs of yet another IoT thing.”16 According to
Krebs, “there is a good chance your newly adopted IoT puppy will
be chewing holes in your network defenses; gnawing open new
critical security weaknesses; bred by a vendor that seldom and
belatedly patches; [and] tough to wrangle down and patch.”17
Krebs quotes Craig Williams, the security outreach manager at
Cisco, who has said:
Compromising IoT devices allow unfettered access though the network
to any other devices on the network . . . .To make matters worse almost
no one has access to [an IoT’s operating system] to notice that it has
been compromised. No one wakes up and thinks, “Hey, it’s time to
update my thermostats [sic] firmware.”18

This means that the Internet of Heirlooms and Disposable
Things will stay likely stay compromised, giving hackers an ideal
opening to laterally move through our networks.19
Bad defaults on IoT devices are common and most users
cannot easily patch them. The process is usually complicated.20
What’s worse is that the updating process for the IoT does not
scale well. The typical lifetime of software is around 2 years. 21 But
the estimated lifetime of some objects now connected to the

16

Krebs, This is Why People Fear the ‘Internet of Things’, supra note 13.
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Krebs, This is Why People Fear the ‘Internet of Things’, supra note 13.
17
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Internet is often around 10 years.22 Just think about how long
coffee pots and refrigerators last. The “Internet of Things We Keep
a Long Time” is a security nightmare.
Yet with few important exceptions,23 the law has been largely
agnostic regarding the decision to wire-up an artifact. The law is
caught up in an information-centric approach to the regulation of
data security. It abstracts away too many of the significant features
of materiality—the very tangibility of things.24 Companies are
required to provide reasonable privacy and data security for the
information they collect. But there is very little regulatory
compliance cost for merely connecting artifacts to the Internet.
This article suggests that there should be.
For example, the law might require more systemic
consideration from IoT companies of the intended use and
expected lifecycle of their artifacts. It could require companies
provide appropriate protection for users that directly takes an
object’s lifecycle into account—an option we develop in greater
detail below. Ultimately, a more measured approach to the IoT,
such as this article is proposing, will help ensure the development
and sale of safer technologies. It would alleviate some of the risk
of harm faced by IoT users—users who have little knowledge of
and ability to respond to the risks presented by the Internet of
Heirlooms and Disposable Things.

22

Id.
ASUS Settles FTC Charges That Insecure Home Routers and “Cloud”
Services Put Consumers’ Privacy At Risk, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Feb.
23, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/02/asus-settlesftc-charges-insecure-home-routers-cloud-services-put; FTC Approves Final
Order Settling Charges Against TRENDnet, Inc., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
(Feb. 7, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/02/ftcapproves-final-order-settling-charges-against-trendnet-inc.
24
James Grimmelmann, Privacy As Product Safety, 19 WIDENER L.J. 793, 816
(2010) (“[T]he database-centric Fair Information Practice approach has been the
basis for most of the information privacy law the United States actually has.”).
23
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III. MAYBE YOUR UNDERWEAR DOES NOT NEED TO BE
CONNECTED TO THE INTERNET
“Vibrundies” are exactly what they sound like.25 Not even your
underwear is safe from the IoT. The website for the wearable tech
states, “Using vibrations from our special undies power pack,
Vibrundies monitors Twitter for brand mentions and shout-outsgiving you a very special feeling each time one hits . . . . [W]hen
you can’t look at your phone, there’s a better way to feel the buzz
of your social activity[.]”26
This is just one of the many kinds of things that you might be
surprised are part of the IoT. They are all making us vulnerable.
One general problem associated with the IoT is that it can be
buggy, leaving us with inoperable or dysfunctional objects.27
Because the IoT relies upon software and hardware, it is more
complex than most non-digital technologies. The more moving
parts a device has, the more that can go wrong. For example, a
smart television apparently malfunctioned when it broadcast
hardcore pornography during a funeral service for a father and his
young son at a crematorium in Wales.28
The IoT has systemic problems surrounding the collection and
use of personal information. Professor Scott Peppet has identified
four major informational problems with the IoT: 1) discrimination,
2) privacy, 3) security, and 4) consent.29 All four of these issues
should give companies and lawmakers pause regarding the
decision to wire up an artifact.
25

VIBRUNDIES, http://www.vibrundies.com/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2016).
Id.
27
Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Smart Fridge Only Capable of Displaying
Buggy Future of the Internet of Things, MOTHERBOARD (Dec. 11, 2015, 11:33
AM), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/smart-fridge-only-capable-of-displaying
-buggy-future-of-the-internet-of-things.
28
Harry Yorke, Grieving Family’s Horror as Hardcore Pornography Played
at Funeral for Father and Baby Son, WALES ONLINE (Jan. 27, 2016, 6:55 PM),
http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/grieving-familys-horror-hardcorepornography-10797800.
29
Scott Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing
Discrimination, Privacy, Security & Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85 (2014).
26
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Regarding privacy, Peppet argues that sensor data are
particularly hard to de-identify.30 Consent to collecting and using
information is also a true quagmire for the IoT.31 Where exactly do
you put the privacy policy for IoT underwear and IoToilets? The
IoT is one of the most intimate technological movements ever, yet
the mechanism for privacy permissions has never been more
dysfunctional.
And the full version of the IoT is just getting warmed up. The
“innovation at all costs” mantra of Silicon Valley repelled most
meaningful privacy laws over the last twenty years, allowing the
Internet surveillance economy to flourish. The surveillance tech
industry is incredibly powerful. It has been quite helpful in limiting
what technology is allowed to do and say about us when we’re not
looking.32
Consider, for example, the problem of cross-device tracking.
SilverPush is an Indian startup company invested in identifying all
your computing devices.33 Schneier notes that, SilverPush uses
inaudible sounds it embeds in webpages and television
commercials to transmit that personal information back to
SilverPush through the use of cookies.34 This technique allows the
company to track you across all your various devices. According to
Schneier, SilverPush can associate the television commercials you
watch with your web searches.35 It can correlate your tablet
activities with what you do on your computer.36 Privacy and
security research Bruce Schneier emphasizes, “Your computerized
things are talking about you behind your back, and for the most
30

Id.
Id.
32
Bruce Schneier, The Internet of Things that Talk About You Behind Your
Back, SCHNEIER.COM (Jan. 16, 2016), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/
2016/01/the_internet_of.html.
33
FTC Issues Warning Letters to App Developers Using ‘Silverpush’ Code,
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
press-releases/2016/03/ftc-issues-warning-letters-app-developers-using-silverpush-code.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
31

592

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 17: 581

part you can’t stop them -- or even learn what they’re saying.”37
The FTC has already stated that consumers should be told about
such technologies and practices.38
Then there’s the billion-dollar IoT problem mentioned above:
data security. Successful hacks on Internet of Things devices are
legion. VTech and Fisher Price have been hacked.39 Researchers
discovered that an IoT doorbell was revealing users’ WiFi keys.40
Security flaws have been demonstrated in IoT Barbie Dolls,
Samsung Refrigerators, Jeep Cherokees, and a WiFi enabled
TrackingPoint sniper rifle (allowing for hackers to choose their
own targets).41 A GPS child tracker had a flaw that would let
hackers act as a child’s parents.42 Andy Greenberg and Kim Zetter
dubbed 2015 as “[t]he year of insecure internet things.”43
According to Cisco, there are more objects connected to the
Internet than people.44 Every new IoT device provides more attack
surface for hackers.45 Hewlett Packard recently estimated that 70
37

Id.
Id.
39
Samuel Gibbs, Toy Firm VTech Hack Exposes Private Data of Parents and
Children, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2015/nov/30/vtech-toys-hack-private-data-parents-children.
40
John Leyden, One Ring to Own them all: IoT Doorbell Can Reveal your
Wi-Fi Key, THE REGISTER (Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/
01/12/ring_doorbell_reveals_wifi_credentials/.
41
Andy Greenberg & Kim Zetter, How the Internet of Things Got Hacked,
WIRED (Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/12/2015-the-year-theinternet-of-things-got-hacked/.
42
Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, A GPS Tracker for Kids Had a Bug That
Would Let Hackers Stalk Them, MOTHERBOARD (Feb. 2, 2016),
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/a-gps-tracker-for-kids-had-a-bug-that-wouldlet-hackers-stalk-them.
43
GREENBERG & ZETTER, supra note 41.
44
Dave Evans, The Internet of Things: How the Next Evolution of the Internet
Is Changing Everything, CISCO (April 2011), http://share.cisco.com/internet-ofthings.html.
45
Omner Barajas, How the Internet of Things (IoT) Is Changing the
Cybersecurity Landscape, SECURITY INTELLIGENCE (Sept. 17, 2014),
https://securityintelligence.com/how-the-internet-of-things-iot-is-changing-thecybersecurity-landscape/ (citing Evans, supra note 44); Daniel Miessler, HP Study
38
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percent of IoT devices have serious security vulnerabilities.46
Simply put, we have yet to figure out a way to keep the security of
the IoT up to speed with the demand for IoT products.
Government intelligence and law enforcement services are also
quite excited about the Internet of Things. IoT gives law
enforcement another path to surveillance. And they are not shy
about their intentions to exploit that sensor in your underwear or
doll. For example, Director of U.S. National Intelligence James
Clapper recently told a Senate panel as part of his annual
“assessment of threats” against the U.S. that “[i]n the future,
intelligence services might use the [internet of things] for
identification, surveillance, monitoring, location tracking, and
targetingfor recruitment, or to gain access to networks or user
credentials.”47 Trevor Timm, a columnist for The Guardian and
executive director of the Freedom of the Press Foundation, noted
Clapper’s testimony actually supports the claim by many that the
FBI’s recent claim that they are “going dark,” or losing the ability
to surveil suspects because of encryption, are largely overblown.
There are more avenues for surveillance now than ever before.
This is why the design of our technologies matters. Companies’
design decisions will impact the extent to which law enforcement
and surveillance agencies can access your personal information.
For example, Microsoft stores the full-disk version of the
encryption key to Windows 10 in the cloud, providing it the ability
to decrypt upon receiving a government demand for data.48 Apple
Reveals 70 Percent of Internet of Things Devices Vulnerable to Attack, HEWLETT
PACKARD ENTERPRISE (July 29, 2014, 5:09 AM), http://h30499.www3.hp.com/t5/
Fortify-Application-Security/HP-Study-Reveals-70-Percent-of-Internet-of-ThingsDevices/ba-p/6556284#.U_NUL4BdU00.
46
Id.
47
Trevor Timm, The Government Just Admitted it Will Use Smart Home
Devices for Spying, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2016, 3:29 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/feb/09/internet-of-thingssmart-devices-spying-surveillance-us-government.
48
Microsoft Stores Windows 10 Encryption Keys in the Cloud,
SECURITYWEEK (Dec. 30, 2015), http://www.securityweek.com/microsoftstores-windows-10-encryption-keys-cloud.
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has resisted the FBI’s request to cripple its failsafe protective
device on iPhones, which permanently encrypts data on the phone
after a limited number of failed login attempts.49 If we care about
our privacy and the security of our personal information, we
should care about the design and proliferation of the Internet of
Things as unique and trusted parts of our daily lives.
IV. POSSIBLE LEGAL SOLUTIONS
We have argued that the law should better recognize the nature
of “things” in the IoT. The good news is that the law recognizes
that privacy and data security are context dependent.50 Most data
security rules require a broad, “reasonable,” approach.51 This
makes most data security law nimble and adaptive to problems like
those presented by the IoT. Courts and lawmakers can start by
digging deeper.
Depending on the problem to be solved and how severe it is,
lawmakers could take a soft, moderate, or robust approach. The
soft approach would leverage concepts of notice and education
efforts for both industry and users. For example, the government
might help leverage efforts by organizations like “I Am The
Cavalry” to implement best practices among companies and
provide notice to users of the strength of privacy and data security
design for the IoT.52 I Am The Cavalry is a group of concerned
49

A Message to Our Customers, APPLE (Feb. 16, 2016),
http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/
50
Start with Security: A Guide for Business, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf0205-startwithse
curity.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2016).
51
See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of
FTC Data Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230 (2015); Kristina Rozen,
How Do Industry Standards for Data Security Match Up with the FTC’s Implied
“Reasonable” Standards—And What Might This Mean for Liability Avoidance?,
IAPP (Nov. 25, 2014), https://iapp.org/news/a/how-do-industry-standards-fordata-security-match-up-with-the-ftcs-implied-reasonable-standards-and-what-mi
ght-this-mean-for-liability-avoidance.
52
About, I AM THE CAVALRY, https://www.iamthecavalry.org/about/
overview/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2016) (“The Cavalry is a grassroots organization
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security researchers focused on critical infrastructure.53 This group
is working on a five-star rating system for consumer-facing IoT
devices. The rating system will give consumers the “quick ability
to check device security without having to understand the technical
details.”54
I Am The Cavalry has tentatively developed a set of criteria by
which it will evaluate IoT products, which includes categories like
“secure by default,” “secure by design,” “self-contained security”
and “privacy.”55 Soft efforts would also help facilitate the

that is focused on issues where computer security intersect public safety and
human life. The areas of focus for The Cavalry are medical devices,
automobiles, home electronics and public infrastructure.”).
53
I AM THE CAVALRY, https://www.iamthecavalry.org/ (last visited Apr. 5,
2016).
54
Porup, supra note 6.
55
Id. The entire checklist is a good summary of sound design for the IoT:
Security
1. Secure by Default
a. No default passwords shared between devices, or weak out of the box
passwords.
b. All passwords should be randomly created using high quality random number
generators.
c. Advanced features used by small percentage of users should be turned off
(VPN, Remote Administration, etc.).
2. Secure by Design
a. Firmware should be locked down so serial access is not available.
b. Secure Element (SE) or Trusted Protection Modules (TPM) devices should be
used to protect access to the firmware and hardware.
c. All GPIO, UART, and JTAG interfaces on the hardware should be disabled
for production versions.
d. NAND or other memory/storage mediums should be protected with epoxy,
ball sockets (so the memory cannot be removed and dumped), or other methods
to prevent physical attacks.
3. Self-contained security
a. The devices should not rely on the network to provide security. Rather, the
device’s security model should assume the network is compromised and still
maintain protection methods. This can be done with prompts to the users to
accept handshakes between devices trying to access other devices on their
networks.

596

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 17: 581

identification and reporting of security vulnerabilities and bugs.
This might include backing away from the support for “digital
rights management” (“DRM”),56 in which presents security
problems for the Internet of Things. DRM itself can be insecure,
laws that protect DRM can hinder sound security research, and
DRM limits your ability to protect your own devices.57 Consider
the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s proposal to have the World
Wide Web Consortium (“W3C”), the nonprofit body that
maintains the Web’s core standards, adopt rules that would
minimize the risk of security researchers reporting bugs on DRMprotected software.58 Perhaps the government could help facilitate
some kind of market for servicing “walking dead” IoT devices,
which are still in use years after the patches stop.
The moderate approach would involve data security mandates
to embrace the nature of the object in how much data security will
be provided. Generally speaking, most data security laws in the
United States require “reasonable data security.” For example, the
FTC generally prohibits unreasonable data security practices “in
light of the sensitivity and volume of consumer information it
holds, the size and complexity of its business, and the cost of
b. Communication between devices should be encrypted to prevent MitM attacks
and sniffing/snooping.
Privacy
1. Consumer PII not shared with manufacturers or partners
2. Usage data on individual consumer is never shared with partners or
advertisers.
3. Anonymous data for buckets of users on usage patterns is acceptable as long
as it’s proven to not be traceable back to the individual consumers.
4. Data collection policy, type of data collected and usage of data is clearly
documented on site.
56
Julia Layton, How Digital Rights Management Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS (Jan.
3, 2006), http://computer.howstuffworks.com/drm1.htm (explaining what a DRM is).
57
Chris Hoffman, Is DRM a Threat to Computer Security?, MAKEUSEOF
(June 12, 2014), http://www.makeuseof.com/tag/drm-threat-computer-security/.
58
Cory Doctorow, You Can’t Destroy the Village to Save It: W3C vs DRM,
Round Two, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Jan. 12, 2016),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/01/you-cant-destroy-village-save-it-w3c-vsdrm-round-two.
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available tools to improve security and reduce vulnerabilities.”59
Almost ten states require reasonable data security practices, rather
than a specific list of prohibited or mandatory actions.60 Congress
has also explicitly embraced a reasonableness approach to data
security. The Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”),61 the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”),62 and the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”)63 all use reasonableness as a
touchstone for determining the adequacy of data security measures.
The reasonableness standard is not perfect, but it is flexible and
can account for new problems like those presented by the IoT.
Lawmakers and courts might interpret “reasonable security” to
include some minimum expectation for servicing IoT devices and a
floor of data security for even disposable items. Imagine a system
where companies told users how long they think a wired object
will last and how long the company will commit to providing
security patches. In the event that a company goes bankrupt before
then, companies would work quickly to either notify users of its
impending shut down or facilitate the responsibility for security
patches to a third party. This would help us avoid the problem of
“zombie” IoT devices.
A robust response, which should be judiciously deployed,
might include liability for harms facilitated by poor data security or
privacy design. It might also include a specific regulatory regime
akin to the Food and Drug Administration’s regulation of medical
devices.64 Robust regimes like this would be costly, given the
59

Commission Statement Marking the FTC’s 50th Data Security Settlement,
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (January 31, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/system/
files/documents/cases/140131gmrstatement.pdf.
60
See Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC
Data Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2246 n. 80-83 (2015), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2461096.
61
16 C.F.R. § 682.3(a) (2012).
62
45 C.F.R. §§ 164.308 –164.314 (2012).
63
16 C.F.R. §§ 314.3–314.4 (2012).
64
Overview of Device Regulation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/
(last updated Aug. 14, 2015).

598

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 17: 581

widespread availability and diversity of IoT devices. Legislators
might create mandate specific service times based on lifecycles,
rather than just lumping such obligations into the requirement to
provide “reasonable data security.” Although specific, timetables
in the world of data security risk being both under- and overinclusive in different contexts.
In short, the law should take the IoT more seriously, without
pushing the courts and lawmakers to act too hastily. Law should
build upon industry wisdom regarding data security and leverage
existing legal mechanisms like notice, insurance, and flexible
requirements to avoid creating an unreasonable risk of harm to
people.
Regardless of which legal response is selected, industry should
act to work with regulators to ensure that the IoT is safe and
sustainable. In addition to helping clearly notify users of the
downsides to wiring-up an artifact, it could also design its products
(where possible) to become “dumb” once the security patches stop.
Imagine certain products like dolls, coffee makers, refrigerators,
and basketballs that do not need the Internet to function built with
a connectivity “kill switch.” Companies could design products so
that when users decide they have had enough, the chip or antenna
could easily be removed or a built-in switch could disable all of the
object’s network functionality. This sort of “severability” option
would help people easily take risky devices out of circulation and
far away from their networks while still making use of the object.
This short essay has argued that merely connecting something
to the Internet does not automatically make it a better product. The
calculus for whether it is a good idea to wire up an object is much
more complicated than that. Sometimes Internet connectivity
makes us more vulnerable for only minimal gain. One way to
mitigate this problem is for people, lawmakers, and industry to be
more conscientious about the nature of the object that is being
connected. The Internet of Things can be revolutionary, but it
needs nuanced boundaries to be safe and sustainable. If the Internet
of Things ends up being too dangerous, people will probably just
stick to their old, non-connected underwear.

